This study aims to investigate short-term market reaction, including stock returns, volatility, and trading volumes of bidder firms, around the announcement dates of relevant merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in the Eurozone during the sixth takeover wave. We emphasize the observed change in the behavior in the reaction of investors while acquiring firms in the transactions before the global financial crisis.
Introduction
Corporate information is released frequently using many sources of communication. The reaction of stock prices to new available information is a well-established line of research in financial economics, which hinges on the efficient market hypothesis (hereafter EMH).
EMH assumes that the stock market reflects all known information, and reacts immediately to the new value-relevant information that is disclosed by public companies, including a merger or tender offer announcement. Event studies analysing short-term reactions constitute a prevalent approach to determine marginal informational content of corporate announcements through variations in either the stock price or trading volume.
Several studies have investigated the reactions of stock prices to different corporate events or public information releases, most of them focusing on Anglo-Saxon countries.
Earning announcements have been examined by several studies (e.g. Patell, 1976; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Bamber, 1986; Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Francis et al., 2002a; Francis et al., 2002b) . Other corporate events also applying event study methodology include dividend announcements (Pettit, 1972; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Benartzy et al., 1997) , stock splits (Grinblatt et al., 1984; McNichols and Dravid, 1990) , securities recommendations (Bjerring et al., 1983; Liu et al., 1990; Beneish, 1991) , and corporate news (Battacharya et al., 2000; Chan, 2003) .
In addition, there exists extensive literature on the announcement of corporate mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&As). The literature on M&As is replete with studies that evaluate the impact of acquisitions on the participants, both acquiring and targeted firms as well as the combined effect of the resulting company. This is especially true for the US and the UK, since studies regarding European countries are scarce, with a predominant focus on the fifth takeover wave, and generating inconclusive results (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) . European literature is even more scarce regarding big transactions that could involve significant wealth effects on the bidder. To the authorsʼ best knowledge, only Goergen and Renneboog (2004) , while analysing the wealth effects of the European takeover bids during the fifth wave, cut off their sample to a minimum of a $100 million bid. Other authors limiting the amount paid for the target cut off their sample to a much lower amount, (e.g. Faccio et al., 2006) . As established in Rosen (2006) 
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Xavier Auguets-Pratsobrerroca, Monica Martinez-Blasco and Josep García-Blandón 22 involving a target much smaller than that of the bidder should not have much effect on the bidder's stock price. In this study, we consider deals worthing $500 million or more, being the first study to analyse big European transactions during the sixth M&A wave.
Previous research studies have stated that the market for corporate control in Europe, despite some similarities with mature financial markets, possesses unique characteristics, distinct from the US and Asia (Moschieri and Campa, 2009) . In this paper, we aim to analyse the short-term market reactions of bidder firms around the announcement of M&A transactions in the Eurozone, and as prevalent in the related literature, we specifically focus on several determinants of share price reactions.
We contribute to the existing literature in different ways. First, European M&A research is much less extensive than that in the Anglo-Saxon countries. By studying the European market, we could achieve a better understanding of this phenomenon in an environment characterised by weaker investor protection and less-developed capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011) . Some previous studies on the market for corporate control in Europe have shown ideosyncratic characteristics, which differ from the patterns shown in the US and the UK. In Moschieri and Campa (2009) , the authors encourage research to not assume the US and the UKʼs existing theoretical frameworks for M&A, and treat European M&A independently. Moreover, the scarce already existing literature shows disparity in the results, since most results obtained so far are inconclusive. We aim to elucidate these contradictory results obtained by different authors regarding the determinants of price reactions to M&A announcements.
Second, we also contribute to European M&A literature by studying the European takeover bids launched during the sixth takeover wave. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) demonstrated that the characteristics of the takeover within each wave show different patterns from the aforegoing and established fifth wave ending in the middle of 2000, as the dot com bubble burst and the M&A activity collapsed. The M&A market for corporate control remained below its maximum from 1999-2000 until 2003 , when the activity in the takeover market increased until mid-2007. Although the fifth takeover wave has been deeply analysed, only very few studies analyse the takeover bids for the sixth wave. In fact, all studies that include takeover announcementsʼ wealth effects for recent periods use a time period that belongs to both the fifth and sixth takeover waves (Campa and Alexandridis et al. (2012) , while studying the US market, concluded that the US deals were driven by more rational acquisition decisions during the sixth wave. Thus, it appears worthwhile to investigate the European market during the equivalent period.
Third, the paper includes information about not only the returns but also the volatility and volume traded around the announcement date, leading to a more powerful framework for analysis. As explained in Halpern (1983:98) , ʻa merger or a tender offer provides a bundle of signals, all of which generate information that is reflected in the security prices of the acquisition participantsʼ. The returns' volatility is a significant complement for returns as it measures the total impact of the traded stock. The release of information and price volatility is well established in the literature (e.g. Campbell and Hentschel, 1991) . As market returns represent the overall market expectations (Beaver, 1968) , the trading volume reflects traders' idiosyncratic preference to hold, sell, or buy the shares of a firm (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) . The necessity to examine trading volumes was also clearly posed, among others, by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) , because trading volumes preserved the differences among individual investorsʼ beliefs that would be cancelled out in the averaging process implicit in the determination of the equilibrium price.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review about the informational content of M&A announcements in Europe and states the hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the sample and method used, and in section 4 we analyse the empirical results of the univariate residuals obtained. Finally, section 5 presents our concluding remarks.
Literature overwiew and hypotheses development
Existing M&A literature is primarily focused on the Anglo-Saxon markets wherein the research is rich and extensive, and the results are dispersed according to different authors, moments in time, frameworks, the time window under study, and specific data segmentations. In contrast, European M&A empirical research is less extensive and more recent. Many empirical studies evaluating the effects of M&A in the European markets have focused on the fifth takeover wave (Campa and Hernando, 2004; Goergen and Rennegoog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2006; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Martynova and Rennebood, 2006; Martynova and Rennebood, 2009; Martynova and Rennebood, 2011) , and only two have partially studied the sixth wave (Campa and Hernando, 2008; Moschien and Campa, 2009 ).
One of the first studies about the short-term wealth effects of large European takeover bids during the fifth wave is Goergen and Renneboog (2004) . The authors study 228
M&A announcements during a seven-year period, which purely belongs to the fifth merger wave, 1993-2000, finding that bidders react positively with a statistically significant announcement effect of 0.7%. The authors consider hostile and friendly takeovers, domestic and cross-border deals, means of payment, relative size of the target out of the bidder's size, and bidders' diversification or concentration strategy. They also control for countriesʼ institutional differences and investigate the reasons for the M&As.
Following the authors' results, the status of a takeover bid has a large impact on the shortterm announcement reaction, since the hostile acquisitionsʼ reaction on returns are greater than those of friendly ones. Hostile bids result in a negative abnormal return for the bidders, as well as bids for diversification strategies or in cash offer. In addition, they do not find any significant result in their domestic sample, but cross-border mergers show a significant abnormal return of 3.09% to the acquirer. The authors also find a lack of response on its relative size analysis and that the predominant reason for the merger is the synergies.
Almost for the same period, 1993 -2001 analysed the merger activity in 28 continental European countries, in addition to the UK and Ireland, for a total sample of 2,419 announcements. The authors report a positive short-term wealth effect of a 0.5% significant return for the bidders. As in Goergen and Renneboog (2004) , the authors also consider several determinants of share price reactions as follows:
the status of the M&A announcement, private or listed target, domestic or cross-border bid, diversification or industry-focused strategy, means of payment, countries' legal origin, and the stage of the takeover wave. The authors confirmed most of the results obtained by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) , and also when considering the takeover stage occurrence, that takeoversʼ announcements occurring at a later stage of the takeover wave return lower gains to the stakeholders than those occurring at the beginning. In ʻTakeover characteristicsʼ, ʻCharacteristics of the bidding and target firmsʼ, and ʻLegal environment and ownership structureʼ. Regarding the first block of determinants, the authors study the impact on the wealth effect of domestic and cross-border M&A, hostile and friendly deals, the legal status of the target, if bidder and target are related or not in terms of their business, the type of acquisition, the means of payment, deal transparency, and the stage of the takeover announcement. For the ʻCharacteristics of the bidding and target firmsʼ, the authors consider the firm's size, the Q-ratio leverage, cash flow, and the pre-announcement share run-up. Finally, the legal environment is considered by dividing the sample into UK and continental European firms. The list of results is extensive, since most of them are consistent with Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and those previously shown in . Among the results not documented before, the authors demonstrate that hostile takeovers are anticipated, and that a part of the value created by the merger is incorporated prior to the announcement. In addition, partial acquisitions and non-transparent deals lead to losses for shareholders. While all the above mentioned factors are applicable for both the UK and continental European countries, the authors also document the existence of differences between both legal regimes, since the shareholders of takeovers involving UK countries are more able to assess the impact of the M&A announcement on the event day.
Analysing the end of the fifth merger wave (1998) (1999) (2000) , Campa and Hernando (2004) also look at the wealth effect of 262 M&A announcements related to listed firms belonging to 13 continental European countries, in addition to the UK and Ireland.
Contrary to Goergen and Renneboog (2004) , , and European M&A transactions involving a change in control, with its final sample accounting for 2,122 announcements. As prevalent in the literature, the authors divided the sample into domestic and cross-border deals, which showed an increased importance accorded to cross-border deals during the period. The study also concludes that the UK market for corporate control differs from the rest of the European countries, since the UK shows a higher proportion of cross-border, hostile, cash-only deals while in continental European countries, domestic and private deals are more frequent. Ownership structure Finally, Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011) analyse intra-European deals during the fifth takeover wave to extend the literature regarding the M&A failure in the European market.
The authors find a positive and significant abnormal bidding return for the sample of firms willing to acquire privately held companies and a non-significantly different from zero returns if the target firms were listed.
Summarising, the previous literature indicates a wide range of results for almost all the price determinants in M&A transaction announcements. In this paper, we investigate investorsʼ short-term reactions to M&A announcements during the sixth merger wave with the aim to elucidate big European transactions. The research question is as follows:
Do market participants of large capitalisation European firms find M&A announcements informative? As mentioned earlier, we examine the effects of M&A announcements on three measures of informativeness: stock returns, price volatility, and trading volumes.
Following the event study methodology, when information is transmitted to the financial market, investors react by selling shares or acquiring new ones, depending on the expected wealth effect of the information transmitted. Therefore, we should expect to find abnormal market returns when investors agree to sell (negative) or buy (positive) shares on the announcement day. We would obtain a significant volatility if the announcement conveys value-relevant information to the market, even if the market participants do not agree on the positive or negative evaluation of the information. The examination of volatility is particularly important when the event might involve positive or negative interpretation for market participants. Finally, we should expect to obtain positive abnormal trading volumes when the announcement transmits valuable information to investors. In this paper, we assume that the European stock market is efficient. Bansal and Lundblad (2002:231) conclude that ʻthe efficient market hypothesis captures, at least in an economic sense, many of the important aspects of observed equity prices in global marketsʼ when studying the US, the UK, French, German, and Japanese stock markets.
Following the Brown and Warner (1985) Existing literature on European firms is dispersed in the results. Some authors find positive reactions for bidding firms (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011 ) while others do not obtain any reaction at all (Campa and Hernando, 2004) . Assuming that managers act rationally and for the best interests of the firm, we should expect a positive market reaction to the announcement.
Previous research studies document a great number of determinants influencing the marketʼs reaction to M&A announcements, mostly depending on the attributes of the transaction, the stage of the takeover wave, characteristics of bidder and target firms, as well as their legal origins. We examine the possibility of relevance of some of the most largely studied determinants for the sixth M&A wave, which has somewhat contradictory results among the authors studying the fifth wave for the European corporate market control. This continues to render the results obtained nowadays unclear.
Sample Selection and Methodology
In subsections 3.1 and 3.2, we present the sample and dataset used in this research and the method we propose to study the informativeness of M&A announcements. To include a transaction in the study, its value should be greater than $500 million, offering a minimum relative size cut-off as proposed in Healy et al. (1992) , and similar to Goergen and Renneboog (2004) . Transactions must have a disclosed dollar value and a clear announcement date in order to be considered in the study.
In total, 45 different companies announcing relevant transactions have been studied, leading us, once cleaned events with confounding effects, to a final sample size of 125 events. Table 1 shows the events distribution among the years, and classified by price change determinants. As depicted, our sample is mostly constituted by friendly cross-border M&A announcements, paid in cash, which is the primary strategy focusing on obtaining a majority stake. We follow the Brown and Warner (1985) event study methodology to assess the informational content around acquisition date announcements. Abnormal price changes (Beaver, 1968) and trading volumes (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) are investors' responses to the disclosure of information; thus, we expect abnormal prices and trading volumes whenever the transaction translates new information to the financial markets.
We test the aggregate market's average reaction to information released by testing changes in prices through two different measures: abnormal returns (ARs) and absolute value abnormal returns (AARs). Additionally, we examine the activity of individual investors around M&A announcements by analysing the change in trading volumes.
These three indicators of the market reaction to the release of information have been tested by a t-test when the data is normally distributed, and otherwise by a non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989; Corrado and Zivney, 1992 (1) Amounts in US million dollars absolute values is zero, will be rejected. Therefore, we correct the absolute returns by the mean value of the pre-event period. Finally, we define abnormal volume (AV) as the number of shares traded on a given day divided by the average shares traded over the preand post-event estimation periods.
Given the nature of the event, it is meaningful to address the behaviour of prices and trading volumes not only on the announcement day but also some days before and after the event. If there is insider trading, we should observe a market reaction before the announcement date, while there could also be a delayed market reaction to the information released. To capture these possible effects, we do not limit our research to the day of the event but also examine an 11-day event window [-5, +5] . According to Haleblian et al. (2009) , it is very common to examine firms' behaviour around M&A announcements by analysing ARs over a short window period of one to five days.
Lastly, cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR), cumulative average absolute value abnormal return (CAAAR), and cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAV) have all been obtained by adding AAR, AAAR, or AAV across different time intervals within the event window.
Appendix 1 describes the computations in detail.
Results
Results are presented in six tables (Tables 3 to 8) 4.1. Results using the entire sample of events Table 3 summarises the results of the entire sample analysis. For the announcement of an M&A transaction, our results do not show any evidence of a return reaction on the event day. Therefore, H1 cannot be rejected, and the conclusion, just following the price reaction on returns, should be that the market is not reacting to the announcements. This finding is consistent with Campa and Hernando (2004) wherein the ARs for bidding firms received insignificant excess returns. In addition, in Faccio et al. (2006) , the authors do not find any reaction while bidding for a listed target. However, our results are contrary to those of Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Renneboog (2006, 2011) where excess returns were found significant and positive.
Nevertheless, panels 2 and 3 depict an observation that is not shown in panel 1, that is, a significant (at 1% level) market reaction in terms of volatility of returns and volume traded. Thus, we can reject our null hypotheses H2 and H3, and therefore conclude that there is a stockholder reaction to the announcement. The results obtained suggest that investors do not achieve a consensus in buying or selling their stocks on the announcement day, thereby increasing the market volatility and the number of shares traded.
During the following days, we can observe a slightly selling market reaction on day t=+1, with a decrease in volatility and the number of shares traded. Our results may suggest that investors require some time for decision making, once the M&A announcement is made, and when they decide, it mostly pertains to selling their stocks. High volatility and higher than average abnormal volume traded is steadily maintained during t+2, and decreases to a much slightly reaction on t+3.
For the multi-day tests, we only report the negative significant results for CAAR for the entire period, [-5, 5 Graph 1 illustrates the differences in the return reaction between the entire sample and the events belonging to the first half of the wave. 
Determinants of price reaction
As explained earlier, our sample mostly comprises friendly (n=106), cross-border (n=86), focus strategy (n=106), and paid cash (n=93) M&A announcements. Results from each of the laterʼs price determinants (not reported) provide the same conclusion we achieve for the entire sample: no reaction can be seen on the event day when just looking at returns (none of them are significant at any level of significance), but the volatility and volume traded are, in all cases, greater than the average and significant at different levels, depending on the subsample. Therefore, our results show that on the event day, investors of bidding firms involved in a friendly transaction or in a cross-border deal, as well as investments in the same industry sector or those paying cash, trade abnormally by reacting to the new information. Furthermore, when we examine the returns and volatility, we can conclude that investors do not have a clear direction regarding the trading (buying or
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Once again, our results are consistent with the findings of Campa and Hernando (2004) and Faccio et al. (2006) , who do not document any significant reaction for friendly, crossborder, concentration strategy, or paid-cash deals. Our results also do not show any return reaction to domestic transaction announcements (not reported), which is also consistent with Goergen and Renneboog (2004) , Campa and Hernando (2004) , and Faccio et al. Table 6 . This table summerises daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal trading volumes around M&A announcements for small transactions. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively Table 5 Tables 3 and 4. Considering returns reaction first, panel 1, on a daywise basis, we do not observe any reaction on the event day, and thus, we cannot reject H01. Consequently, our results are similar to those obtained by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) . Nonetheless, the lack of reaction on the event day could be because the market has reacted in advance, as our results show a negative and significant (at the 5% level) reaction on t-1. This price reaction is also supported by a highest than average reaction in the number of shares traded on t-1 and t-2 (panel 3), and also an increase in volatility on t-2 (panel 2). Following the event day, high levels of price volatility and shares traded are reported on the post-event window, thus suggesting that investors seem to adjust their investment portfolio, before, during, and after a big M&A transaction announcement but without agreeing in a day bases in buying or selling their stocks. However, a multi-day test for
ARs shows a negative significance on all accumulated post-event periods, thus suggesting that the short-term reaction of investors of bidding firms involved in a big transaction is mostly to sell their stocks.
We can, therefore, conclude that market participants seem to act along the event window resulting in statistically significant cumulative returns, returns volatilities, and trading volumes.
Otherwise, investorsʼ reactions to the announcement of small transactions are almost insignificant. As depicted in Table 6 , our results show a returnʼs marginally negative reaction on t+2, panel 1, accompanied with an increase in volatility, significant at the 5% level. These results clearly suggest that smaller transactions in terms of relative size to the acquiring company, are not relevant to investors. The investors possibly understand that these transactions are not relevant enough on average to make them consider to buy or sell the stock due to the announcement.
Therefore, we can conclude that size matters, since in general, the larger the acquisition size with respect to the acquiring company, the more relevant is the transaction for investors, the more negative the market reaction is to the new acquisition, and the more significant is the abnormality of the behaviour of stock prices around the announcement date.
In our opinion, this could explain why some other studies in Europe such as Campa and Hernando (2004) found no significance in the bidders' reaction when considering all-size transactions of large and non-large companies in Europe, as in this case: 1) many low relative size transactions were included in the studied universe of transactions; and 2) the extended framework including volatility of returns and trading volumes is not used. Table 7 . This table summerises daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal trading volumes around M&A announcements for full bid transactions. Superscript ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively Finally, we analyse the market reaction by type of acquisition. Table 7 reports the results regarding the 27 announcements making public a full bid. As can be seen, for the event day and following our results, we reject the null hypothesis H01 at the 5% level, and both H02 and H03 at the 1% level for this subsample. These results are quite similar to those obtained for events belonging to the first half of the wave; negative ARs, jointly with an increase in volatility and the number of shares traded. On a daywise basis, the reaction lasts for the following two days in returns and returns volatility, and for the entire window period for the shares traded. The multi-day CAARs [-1, 0] Table 8 , we show the results for the events announcing a bid over a minority stake. For the event day, we can only reject H03, as our results do not support a significant reaction of stock prices to an M&A announcement, making public the acquisition of a minority stake. Therefore, the two null hypotheses concerning price changes cannot be rejected.
The volume traded is significant, not only on the event day, but also for all cumulative periods, thus indicating that the announcements make investors change their portfolio investment. The results also indicate a market reaction on t+2, as AAAR is positive and significant at the 1% level, which is also accompanied with an increase in the number of shares traded also on t+2. This may indicate investorsʼ late reaction to the announcement.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the market reaction to big M&A announcements made by European companies during the sixth wave. To our best knowledge, this is the first study to not only analyse the European M&A market for big transactions during the sixth wave, but also the first one to use three indicators of the market reaction. Our results indicate that the use of returns volatility and trading volume in additon to returns is crucial to understand investorsʼ reactions to the announcements. Thereby, the use of returns alone, when not significant, may lead us to conclude that investors are not reacting to announcements. This is our conclusion on analysing the entire sample, when empirical evidence shows that the market is reacting to the announcement with an increase in volatility and the number of shares traded. The framework is particularly useful when M&A information is not probably interpreted equally by all the investors, and therefore we cannot observe a direct response in the returns. Thus, we would like to emphasise the importance of including abnormal changes in the volatility of returns and trading volumes, jointly with returns in future analyses to obtain more accurate and definitive conclusions about the market reaction to specific events such as M&A transactions.
The analysis of the sixth takeover wave has allowed us to divide the announcements before the global financial crisis. Our results are clear about investorsʼ reaction to an M&A announcement during the first half of the wave: selling their stocks with an important increase in the number of shares traded. Moreover, we also concluded that ʻsize mattersʼ in terms of M&A events. The Eurozone equity markets reacted more on average in the short term around the acquisition announcement dates, and the greater is the relative size of the transaction with respect to the market capitalisation of the acquiring company.
Both the size and type of acquisition help the investors consider to take action or not regarding their investment portfolio. Full bids make the investors react similarly to event announcements during 2003 to July 2007, this is, selling their stocks.
The limitations of this study are based on the characteristics of the European takeover market. The preference for friendly agreements prevents us from analysing the effect of hostile takeovers. In addition, the preference for cash payments has prevented us from analysing the effect of an M&A announcement offering equity as a payment method.
Lastly, most transactions have been observed to occur in the same industry, leaving just 18 events for diversification strategies. *** The authors gratefully acknowledge the funding received from the Generalitat de Catalunya and Universitat Ramon Llull.
APPENDIX 1: Abnormal return and volume calculations

Abnormal return
The return of security i over period t is defined as: Rit = E(Rit | Xt)it + ARit
[1]
where, Rit , E(Rit|Xt)it and ARit are the actual, normal, and abnormal returns, respectively, and Xt is the conditioning information set for the normal return model.
We compute expected or normal returns by using the market model, thus we assume that normal return is given by a linear relationship between the stock and the market return.
( | ) = + We estimate the security normal returns through a pre-event period of 151 days starting on day -170 to day -20 been day 0 the M&A announcement date.
Average abnormal returns (AARs) has been obtain averaging abnormal returns of each event. Thus, AARs is calculated as:
The t-statistic for AAR any day in the event period is given by:
The sixth merger wave and wealth effects of M&A announcements: an analysis of large European bidding companies
[5]
Where Sp is the standard deviation of the abnormal return over the pre-event period. 
Absolute Abnormal Return
Absolute abnormal returns has been obtain appliying the absolute value of each abnormal return. Then, we proceed averaging them, thus AAAR is given by:
Where AAAR it is the AAAR mean over the pre-event period.
And its corresponging ecuation for t-statistic at any day is given by: Where V it is the traded volume in euros of stock i on day t.
Once abnormal daily volumes have been computed for each firm, the average abnormal trading volume (AAV) on day t is calculated as:
The cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAV) is obtained by adding average daily abnormal volumes across different time intervals (a, b) , within the event window [-5, +5] .
Its corresponging ecuation for t-statistic at any day is given by:
Rank test
We transform each firm's AR in ranks (Ki) over the combined period, including the estimation and the event window (Ti).
The test compares the ranks in the event period for each firm, with the expected average rank under the null hypothesis of no ARs. The test statistic for the null hypothesis is:
where:
